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Introduction

A

s long as there have been trials for violations of the laws and customs of
war, more popularly known as "war crimes trials", the trial tribunals have
been confronted with the defense of "superior orders"-the claim that the
accused did what he did because he was ordered to do so by a superior officer
(or by his Government) and that his refusal to obey the order would have brought
dire consequences upon him. And as along as there have been trials for violations
of the laws and customs of war the trial tribunals have almost uniformly rejected
that defense. However, since the termination of the major programs of war
crimes trials conducted after World War II there has been an ongoing dispute
as to whether a plea of superior orders should be allowed, or disallowed, and, if
allowed, the criteria to be used as the basis for its application. Does international
action in this area constitute an invasion of the national jurisdiction? Should the
doctrine apply to all war crimes or only to certain specifically named crimes?
Should the illegality of the order received be such that any "reasonable" person
would recognize its invalidity; or should it be such as to be recognized by a
person of "ordinary sense and understanding"; or by a person of the "commonest
understanding"? Should it be "illegal on its face"; or "manifesdy illegal"; or
"palpably illegal"; or of "obvious criminality,,?1 An inability to reach a generally
acceptable consensus on these problems has resulted in the repeated rejection of
attempts to legislate internationally in this area. Consequendy, the continued
existence of an international rule denying superior orders as a defense to a charge
of violating the laws and customs of war appears to be injeopardy-ifit has not
already ceased to exist?
More than five centuries ago, when one Peter von Hagenbach was tried by
an "international" tribunal for maltreating, and permitting his subordinates to
maltreat, the inhabitants of the town ofBreisach while he was in command of
what might be termed a military occupation (although the war did not begin
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until thereafter), his defense was that his actions were in compliance with the
orders of his master, the Duke of Burgundy. Even though complete obedience
to the commands of one's liege lord was a way of life in the fifteenth century,
and even though human life, particularly of civilians, was not respected then as
3
it is today, von Hagenbach was found guilty and he was sentenced to death.
Similarly, in 1865, at the conclusion of the American Civil War, when
Captain Henry Wirz, the erstwhile Confederate commander of the notorious
prisoner-of-war camp at Andersonville, Georgia, was tried before a federal
Military Commission for the maltreatment of the prisoners ofwar in his custody,
one of his defenses was "superior orders." In his personal summation Wirz said:4
I think I may also claim as a self-evident proposition that ifI, a subaltem officer,
merely obeyed the legal orders of my superiors in the discharge of my official
duties, I cannot be held responsible for the motives that dictated such orders.

Against this claim the prosecutor asserted:

5

I know that it is urged that during all this time he was acting under General
Winder's orders, and for the purpose of argument I will concede that he was so
acting. A superior officer cannot order a subordinate to do an illegal act, and if a
subordinate obey such an order and disastrous consequences result, the superior
and the subordinate must answer for it. General Winder could no more command
the prisoner to violate the laws of war than could the prisoner do so without
orders. The conclusion is plain, that where such orders exist both are guilty....
And notwithstanding his earnest appeal, made to you in his final statement,
begging that he, a poor subaltern, acting only in obedience to his superior, should
not bear the odium and punishment deserved, with whatever force these cries of
a desperate man, in a desperate and terrible strait, may come to you, there is no
law, no sympathy, no code of morals, that can warrant you in refusing to let him
have all justice, because the lesser and not the greater criminal is on trial.

Wirz was found guilty and he was sentenced to death. 6
It is interesting to note that in the first (1906) edition of his now famous and
standard work on international law, Oppenheim said?
Ifmembers ofthe armed forces commit violations by order oftheir Government,
they are not war criminals and cannot be punished by the enemy; the latter can,
however, resort to reprisals. In case members offorces commit violations ordered
by their commanders, the members may not be punished, for the commanders
are alone responsible, and the latter may, therefore, be punished as war criminals
on their capture by the enemy.
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That statement, or one closely resembling it, appeared in the subsequent
editions of Oppenheim's treatise, with its various editors, including the first
8
edition (the 5th) edited by Lauterpacht. In the next (6th) edition Lauterpacht
9
reversed hirl'Iself and in the 7th edition, the last that he edited (and the last
edition of the second volume that has appeared to date), the following rule is
10
set forth:
253. The fact that a rule of warfare has been violated in pursuance of an order
of the belligerent Govemment or of an individual belligerent commander does
not deprive the act in question of its character as a war crime; neither does it, in
principle, confer upon the perpetrator immunity from punishment by the injured
belligerent. A different view has occasionally been adopted in military manuals,
and by writers, but it is difficult to regard it as expressing a sound legal principle.
Undoubtedly, a Court confronted with the plea of superior orders adduced in
justification of a war crime is bound to take into consideration the fact that
obedience to military orders, not obviously unlawful, is the duty of every member
of the armed forces and that the latter cannot, in conditions of war discipline, be
expected to weigh scrupulously, the legal merits of the order received; that rules
of warfare are often controversial; and that an act otherwise amounting to a war
crime may have been executed in obedience to orders conceived as a measure of
reprisals. Such circumstances are probably in themselves sufficient to divest the
act of the stigma of a war crime.... However, subject to these qualifjcations, the
question is governed by the major principle that members of the armed forces are
bound to obey lawful orders only and that they cannot therefore escape liability
if, in obedience to a command, they commit acts which both violate unchallenged
rules of warfare and outrage the general sentiment of humanity.
The Preliminary Peace Conference which met at Versailles in 1919 to draft
a treaty of peace with Germany at the end of World War II established a

Commission on the Responsibility oj the Authors oj the War and on Enforcement oj
Penalties with the task ofinquiring into and reporting upon, among other things,
the degree of responsibility for breaches of the laws and customs of war. In its
report the Commission listed thirty-two types of violations of the laws and
customs of war and, concerning the defense of superior orders, its report
.
1y stated:11
unammous
We desired to say that civil and military authorities cannot be relieved from
responsibility by the mere fact that a higher authority might have been convicted
of the same offence. It will be for the court to decide whether a plea of superior
orders is sufficient to acquit the person charged from responsibility.
Article 228 of the Treaty oj Versailles which actually ended World War I for
many of the belligerents required the German Government to hand over to the
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Allied Governments for trial "all persons accused of having committed an act in
violation of the laws and customs ofwar.,,12 In the face of the public opinion
prevailing in Germany at that time no Government could have survived
compliance with such a requirement and so it was subsequently agreed that the
individuals named would, instead, be tried by the Supreme Court of Leipzig.
The trials were a fiasco;13 but in one of them, involving the trial of two officers
who had obeyed the order of their commanding officer to fire upon the lifeboats
14
of a hospital ship which their submarine had torpedoed, the German Court said:
It is true that according to the [German] Military Penal Code, if the execution
'of an order in the ordinary course of duty involves such a violation of the law as
is punishable, the superior officer issuing such an order is alone responsible.
However, the subordinate obeying an order is liable to punishment, if it was
known to him that the order of the superior involved the infringement of civil or
military law. This applies in the case of the accused. It is certainly to be urged in
favour of the military subordinates that they are under no obligation to question
the order of their superior officer, and they can count upon its legality. But no
such confidence can be held to exist, if such an order is universally known to
everybody, including the accused, to be without any doubt whatever against the
law.

The accused were found guil~ by the Court and were sentenced to
•
.
fcor a term 0 f years. 15
Impnsonment
16
While the 1922 Treaty cf Washington never came into force because of the
failure of ratification by France, it is of interest to note that Article 3 thereof stated:
The Signatory Powers, desiring to ensure the enforcement of the humane rules
of existing law declared by them with respect to attacks upon and the seizure and
destruction of merchant ships, further declare that any person in the service ofany
Power who shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is under
orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of
war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy and may
be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities ofany Power within the
jurisdiction of which he may be found.
Although the inter-war period (1919-1939) was far from free ofintemational
hostilities, the subject of war crimes trials appears to have been raised, or even
written about by the students of the subject, on comparatively few occasions. 17
World War II and its Aftermath

All during the course of World War II there had been statements made by
the Allies that there would be trials for those major war criminals who had

Superior Orders

273

plunged the world into catastrophic war and for those individuals who had
1S
otherwise violated international law. A private conference of British and
European jurists from occupied countries which met in Cambridge in
November 1941 established a committee to draft rules and procedures to govern
war crimes trials. The sub-committee on superior orders concluded that
generally speaking, the codes oflaw of the respective countries recognize the plea
of superior orders to be valid if the order is given by a superior to an inferior
officer, within the course of his duty and within his normal competence, provided
the order is not blatantly illegal. The conclusion reached was that each case must
be considered on its own merits, but that the plea is not an automatic defence. 19
The London International Assembly, established by the League of Nations
Union of Great Britain, adopted a resolution which included the following with
respect to the defense of superior orders?O

(a) That an order given by a superior to an inferior to commit a crime violating
intemationallaw was not in itself a defence, but that the Courts were entitled to
consider whether the accused was placed in a 'state of compulsion' to act as
ordered, and acquit him or mitigate the punishment accordingly;
(b) That such exculpating or extenuating circumstances should in all cases be
disregarded in two types of cases: when the act was so obviously heinous that it
could not be committed without revolting the conscience of an average human
being; and when the accused was, at the time of the offence, a member of an
organization whose membership implied the execution of criminal orders.
The United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes (later the
United Nations War Crimes Commission) was established in London on 20
October 1943 by 17 of the States at war with Germany and Japan. (The Soviet
Union was not represented at this meeting, nor did it later participate in the
activities of the Commission.)21 Its Legal Committee concluded that a general
understanding between the victorious belligerent nations on the subject of
superior orders was desirable and stated that it believed the following rule to be
.
·h·mternatlOn
. allaw: 22
conSIstent
Wit
The defence of obedience to superior orders shall not constitute ajustification
for the commission of an offence against the laws and customs of war, if the order
was so manifestly contrary to those laws or customs that, taking into account his
rank or position and the circumstances surrounding the commission ofthe offence,
an individual of ordinary understanding would have known that such an order
was illegal.

274

Levie on the Law of War

This recommendation did not meet with unanimous support and the
Commission's Enforcement Committee eventually recommended that the
Commission submit the following statement to the Governments?3
The Conunission has considered the question of 'superior orders'. It finally
decided to leave out any provision on the subject.... The Conunission considers
that it is better to leave it to the court itself in each case to decide what weight
should be attached to a plea of superior orders. But the Conunission wants to
make it clear that its members unanimously agree that in principle this plea does
not of itself exonerate the offenders.
Finally, in March 1945, the Commission itself adopted the following
..
24
pOSlt:l.on:
Having regard to the fact that many, if not most, of the members States have
legal rules on the subject, some of which have been adopted very recently, and
that in most cases these rules differ from one another, and to the further
consideration that the question how far obedience to the orders of a superior
exonerates an offender or mitigates the punishment must depend on the
circumstances of the particular case, the Commission does not consider that it can
usefully propound any principle or rule.
The Conunission unanimously maintains the view . . . that the mere fact of
having acted in obedience to the orders of a superior does not of itself relieve a
person who has conunitted a war crime from responsibility.
Early in 1945 the United States prepared a draft of a proposal for an
international military tribunal to try the major German war criminals. Paragraph
25
11 of that proposal stated:
The fact that a defendant acted pursuant to order of a superior or government
sanction shall not constitute an absolute defense but may be considered either in
defense or in mitigation of punishment if the tribunal before which the charges
are being tried determines that justice so requires.
That proposal was submitted to the representatives of the Provisional French
Government, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom at San Francisco in
April 1945, together with a later draft in which a paragraph concerning trial
procedures contained a sub-paragraph stating that any agreement on the matter
should include a provision which could,
(c) except as the court in its discretion shall deem appropriate in particular cases,
exclude any defense based upon the fact that the accused acted under orders of a
. 0 ffi cer or pursuant to state or natlon
· a lpo
l icy. 26
supenor
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Then, on 14 June 1945, the United States distributed a revision of its draft
proposal, a document which later became the working paper for the London
Conference which met to draft the definitive Charter of the International
Military Tribunal. Paragraph 15 of that revision statedP
In any trial before an International Military Tribunal the fact that a defendant
acted pursuant to order of a superior or government sanction shall not constitute
a defense per se, but may be considered either in defense or in mitigation of
punishment if the tribunal determines that justice so requires.
In a further Revised Draft submitted by the United States on 30 June 1945,
during the course ofthe London Conference, the relevant paragraph now read?8

17. The fact that a defendant acted pursuant to order of a superior or to
government sanction shall not constitute a defense per se, but may be considered
in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.

A Soviet proposal which was tabled at the Conference on 2July 1945 stated?9
ARTICLE 29
Carrying Out of an Order
The carrying out by the defendant of an order of his superior or government
shall not be considered a reason excluding his responsibility for the crimes set out
in Article 2 of this Statute. In certain cases, when the subordinate acted blindly in
carrying out the orders of this superior, the Tribunal has right to mitigate the
punishment of the defendant.
A drafting subcommittee was then created by the Conference. The provision
which it drafted on the question of superior orders varied little from that set
forth in the last revision proposed by the United States?O

8. The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of a superior or the
Government sanction shall not free him from responsibility but may be considered
in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.
In what was apparently the only real discussion ofsuperior orders which took
place at the London Conference, the following occurred?1
General Nikitchenko: In article 7 [8?] of the Charter I do not propose any
change but would like to point out two considerations. Would it be proper really
in speaking of major criminals to speak of them as carrying out some order of a
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superior? This is not a question ofprinciple really, but I wonder if thatis necessary
when speaking of major criminals.
Sir David Maxwell Fyfe: There are two points: first, they have already said they
were just doing what Hitler said they should do; and secondly, in international
law, certainly in some cases, superior orders were a defense, but in the sixth and
seventh editions of Oppenheim it appears that they aren't a defense. If we don't
make it clear, we may have some trouble on it.
General Nikitchenko: There is a misunderstanding. I wasn't against disallowing
orders of a superior as a defense, but I thought that in regard to major criminals
it would be improper to say that superior orders could be used in mitigation of
punishment.
Sir David Maxwell Fyfe: It seems to me difficult. Suppose someone said, he
was threatened to be shot ifhe did not carry out Hitler's orders. Ifhe wasn't too
important, the Tribunal might let him off with his life. It seems 'to be a matter for
the Tribunal.
In one of the German cases on trial which were such a farce after the last war
they did say that superior orders were no defense but could be taken into account
on mitigation. That has been the general rule on superior orders in international
law books.
General Nikitchenko: If the other heads of the delegations consider it best, we
have no intention of pressing it. In general, it should be considered in mitigation;
we think it is proper.

****
Judge Falco: Is it necessary to indicate to the Tribunal the reason for mitigation?
If we say simply that orders are not a defense, it would seem to be left to the
tribunal to say that they may be in mitigation.
MrJustice Jackson: That is about what we proposed originally-not an absolute
defense but a mitigation.
Sir David Maxwell Fyfe: The important part is that it should not be an absolute
defense.
Judge Falco: That is the important part. Must we add that that is the reason for
the Tribunal to consider mitigation?
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With some minor editing the Article 8 set forth above became Article 8 of
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal which later sat in Nuremberg.
32
As finally adopted it stated:
Article 8. The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be
considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice sq
requires.
In applyin~ that rule at the Nuremberg Trial the International Military
Tribunal said: 3
The provisions of this Article are in conformity with the law of all nations.
That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in violation of the intemationallaw
of war has never been recognized as a defense to such acts of brutality, though, as
the Charter here provides, the order may be urged in mitigation ofthe punishment.
The true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law ofmost nations,
is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was in fact possible.
Another statement in that judgment was to effect that34
When they [certain of the defendants] with knowledge of his [Hitler's] aims,
gave him their cooperation, they made themselves parties to the plan he had
initiated. They are not to be deemed innocent because Hitler made use of them,
if they knew what they were doing. That they were assigned to their tasks by a
dictator does not absolve them from responsibility for their acts. The relation of
leader and follower does not preclude responsibility here any more than it does
in the comparable tyranny of organized domestic crime. 35
In considering whether the General Staff and the High Command of the
Gennany anned forces should be found to be criminal organizations, the
36
Tribunal said:
Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier's oath of obedience
to military orders. When it suits their defense they say they had to obey; when
confronted with Hitler's brutal crimes, which are shown to have been within their
general knowledge, they say they disobeyed.
On 20 December 1945 the Allied Control Council for Gennany, consisting
of military representatives of the Occupying Powers, the same four nations
which had drafted the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
promulgated Allied Control Council Law No. 10, setting forth the basis for the
trials in Gennany of war criminals other than those to be tried by the
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37
International Military Tribunal. The provisions of Article II(4) (b) of that Law
with respect to superior orders were substantially the same as those ofthe London
Charter:

The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order ofhis Government or of
a superior does not free him from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered
in mitigation.
In The Hostage Case the Tribunal, convened pursuant to Law No. 10, held: 38
Implicit obedience to orders ofsuperior officers is almost indispensable to every
military system. But this implies obedience to lawful orders only. If the act done
pursuant to a superior's orders be murder, the production of the order will not
make it any less so. It may mitigate but it cannot justify the order. We are of the
view, however, that if the illegality of the order was not known to the inferior,
and he could not reasonably have been expected to know of its illegality, no
wrongful intent necessary to the commission ofa crime exists and the inferior will
be protected. But the general rule is that members of the armed forces are bound
to obey only the lawful orders oftheir commanding officers and they cannot escape
criminal liability by obeying a command which violates international law and
outrages fundamental concepts ofjustice.
In effect, here the Tribunal was saying that if the subordinate did not know
and could not be expected to know that the order was illegal, there was no
criminal intent, no mens rea, and the subordinate would not be guilty. The
opinion in The Einsatsgruppen Case is to the same effect, the Tribunal there having
Sal·d:

39

Those of the defendants who admit participation in the mass killings which are
the subject of this trial, plead that they were under military orders and, therefore,
had no will of their own. As intent is a basic prerequisite to responsibility for
crime, they argue that they are innocent of criminality since they performed the
admitted executions under duress, that is to say, superior orders. The defendants
formed part of a military organization and were, therefore, subject to the rules
which govern soldiers. It is axiomatic that a military man's first duty is to obey. If
the defendants were soldiers and as soldiers responded to the command of their
superiors to kill certain people, how can they be held guilty of crime? That is the
question posed by the defendants. The answer is not a difficult one.
The obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of an automaton. A soldier is
a reasoning agent. He does not respond, and is not expected to respond, like a
piece of machinery. It is a fallacy of wide-spread consumption that a soldier is
required to do everything his superior officer orders him to do .... The fact that a
soldier may not, without incurring unfavorable consequences, refuse to drill,
salute, exercise, reconnoiter, and even go into battle, does not mean that he must
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fulfill every demand put to him. In the first place, an order to require obedience
must relate to military duty. An officer may not demand of a soldier, for instance,
that he steal for him. And what the superior officer may not militarily demand of
his subordinate, the subordinate is not required to do. Even if the order refers to
a military subject it must be one which the superior is authorized, under the
circumstances, to give.
The subordinate is bound only to obey the lawful orders ofhis superior and if
he accepts a criminal order and executes it with a malice of his own, he may not
plead superior orders in mitigation of his offense. If the nature of the ordered act
is manifesdy beyond the scope of the superior's authority, the subordinate may
not plead ignorance to the criminality of the order. If one claims duress in the
execution of an illegal order it must be shown that the harm caused by obeying
the illegal order is not disproportionally greater than the harm which would result
from not obeying the illegal order. 40
In High Command Case, the Tribunal before which that case was tried quoted
a 1944 statement of Goebbels, the Nazi Propaganda Minister, in which he had
Sal·d: 41
It is not provided in any military law that a soldier in the case of a despicable
crime is exempt from punishment because he passes the responsibility to his
superior, especially if orders of the latter are in evident contradiction to all human
morality and every international usage of warfare.

As would be expected, that statement was made in his official capacity as
Minister of Propaganda and referred to alleged acts of Allied troops. It was not
intended as a statement of German military law, nor as an admonition to the
German soldier.
Concerning the act of an intermediate headquarters in passing down to its
subordinate commands an order received from higher headquarters, the Tribunal
in High Command Case went on to say:42
Military commanders in the field with far reaching military responsibilities
cannot be charged under international law with criminal participation in issuing
orders which are not obviously criminal or which they are not shown to have
known to be criminal under international law. Such a commander cannot be
expected to draw fine distinctions and conclusions as to legality in connection
with orders issued by his superiors. He has the right to presume, in the absence
of specific knowledge to the contrary, that the legality of such orders has been
properly determined before their issuance. He cannot be held criminally
responsible for a mere error in judgment as to disputable legal questions.
It is therefore considered that to find a field commander criminally responsible
for the transmittal of such an order, he must have passed the order to the chain of
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command and the order must be one that is criminal on its face, or one which he
is shown to have known was criminal.

In a digest of the laws applied by various courts which conducted war crimes
trials after World War II the United Nations War Crimes Commission said: 43
The plea of superior orders has been raised by the Defence in war crimes trials
more frequendy than any other. The most common form of the plea consists in
the argument that the accused was ordered to commit the offence by a military
superior and that under military discipline orders must be obeyed. A closely related
argument is that which claims that had the accused not obeyed he would have
been shot or otherwise punished; it is sometimes also maintained in court that
reprisals would have been taken against his family.
It has often been said that an accused is entided under international law to obey
commands which are lawful or which he could not reasonably be expected to
know were unlawful. The question, however, arises whether these commands
must be lawful under municipal law or international law; ... the legality under
municipal law of the acc;used's acts does not free him from liability to punishment
if those acts constitute war crimes, and it seems to follow that the plea of having
acted upon orders which were legal under municipal law must also fail to constitute
a defence. On the other hand, if the order is legal under international law, it is
difficult to show how an act committed in obedience to it could be illegal under
that system.... The true test in practice is whether an order, illegal under
international law, on which an accused has acted was or must be presumed to
have been known to him to be so illegal, or was obviously so illegal ("illegal on
its face" to use the term employed by the Tribunal in the High Command Trial)
or should have been recognised by him as being so illegal.

The provisions contained in Article 8 ofthe London Charter denying superior
orders as a defense and limiting its application to mitigation of punishment were
followed by many of the laws enacted and orders issued after the conclusion of
World War II which were concerned with the trials of violators of the laws and
customs of war. Thus, the Charter attached to the Special Proclamation creating
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East QMTFE), issued on 19 January
1946 by General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied
44
Powers (SCAP), included the following provisions:
Article 6. Responsibility of Accused. Neither the official position, at any time,
of an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted pursuant to order of his
government or of a superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to free such an accused
from responsibility for any crime with which he is charged, but such circumstances
may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that
justice so requires.
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None of the judges ofthe IMTFE, concurring or dissenting, found it necessary
to advert to the quoted provision of its Charter either in the lengthy judgment
. the other op1OIOns.
..
45
or 10
As we have already seen, Article 8 of the London Charter was also the source
for the cognate provision of Allied Control Council Law No. 10 and for similar
46
provisions issued in other occupied territories.

United Nations
On 11 December 1946 the General Assembly of the United Nations
unanimously adopted a resolution the first operative paragraph of which stated
that the General Assembly: 47

Affirms the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal.
Another operative paragraph charged its Committee on Codification Qater
changed to the International Law Commission) with the formulation of those
principles, either in the context of a code of offenses against the peace and
security ofmankind or ofan international criminal code. When the International
Law Commission had prepared its first draft in complying with the task assigned
to it of "formulating" the principles of international law recognized in the
London Charter and in the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, its Principle
IV read as follows: 48
The fact that a person acted pursuant to order ofhis Government or ofa superior
does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral
choice was in fact possible to him.
The overall document received a mixed reception in the Sixth Committee
of the General Assembly, the result of which was the preparation of a draft
resolution, later adopted by the General Assembly,49 referring it to member
States for comment, a process which had early evolved in the United Nations
as a method of indefinite postponement.
The following year, in accordance with the directive received from the
General Assembly, the International Law Commission began to work on a Draft
Code of O.ffonces Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. Article 4 of the first
50
draft text prepared by the Special Rapporteur, J. Spiropoulos, stated:
The fact that a person charged with a crime defined in this code acted under
the orders of a government or a superior may be taken into consideration either
as a defence or in mitigation of punishment ifjustice so requires.
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This proved unacceptable to the Commission which modified the
51
Rapporteur's proposal to read:
The fact that a person charged with an offence defined in this Code acted
pursuant to order of his government or of a superior does not relieve him from
responsibility, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.
In its commentary on this Article the Commission said:
Principle IV of the Commission's formulation of the Nuremberg principles,
on the basis of the interpretation given by the Nuremberg Tribunal to article 8
of its Charter, states: "The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under
international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him."
The observations on principle IV, made in the General Assembly during its
fifth session, have been carefully studied; no substantial modification, however,
has been made in the drafting of this article, which is based on a clear enunciation
by the Nuremberg Tribunal. The article lays down the principle that the accused
is responsible only if, in the circumstances, it was possible for him to act contrary
to superior orders.
The International Law Commission's Draft Code did not meet with any
greater acceptance in the General Assembly than had its formulation of the
Nuremberg Principles and the project was shelved for some time. When it was
once again taken up by the Commission in 1954, Article 4 was redrafted to
52
state:
The fact that a person charged with an offence defined in this Code acted
pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him of
responsibility in international law if, in the circumstances at the time, it was possible
for him not comply with that order.
This time the Commission's commentary stated:
Since some Governments had criticized the expression 'moral choice', the
Commission decided to replace it by the wording of the new text above.
However, on the recommendation of its Sixth Commission, the General
Assembly postponed all action on the draft Code until a decision had been
reached on the definition of aggression. 53 This did not occur until 1974 and the
Drcift Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind did not reappear
on the agenda of the International Law Commission until 1981. During its 1984
session it once again started to have annual discussions on the subject. Most of
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its time has been spent on the question ofthe offenses to be included and through
1986 the problem of superior orders had not been reached for discussion. As a
result, today, almost forty years later, the efforts of the International Law
Commission to "formulate" the Nuremberg Principles and to draft a code of
offenses against the peace and security of mankind have still not been successful.
On the same day that it adopted the resolution on the "formulation" of the
Nuremberg Principles and the drafting of a code of offenses, the General
Assembly adopted another resolution which requested the Economic and Social
Council to draw up a convention on genocide. 54 The Council, in turn,
requested the Secretary-General to collate the comments received and to prepare
a draft convention on the subject. Article V of his draft provided: 55
Command of the law or superior orders shall not justify genocide.
No provision on the subject of superior orders appears in the convention as
eventually drafted and adopted. 56

Other International Efforts to Codify the Rule
We have seen the actions taken by the United Nations General Assembly,
and by its subordinate bodies, concerning the codification ofthe rule with respect
to the non-availability of the defense of superior orders in international criminal
trials. Now let us review the efforts of other international bodies on this subject.
In 1948 the XVIIth (Stockholm) International Red Cross Conference
recommended that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) draft
provisions for the repression of breaches of the humanitarian conventions which
57
were then in the process of evolution and which ultimately became the four
1949 Geneva Conventionsforthe Protedion cifWar Victims. 58 The ICRC complied
with that resolution and, with the help of a small group of recognized experts,
59
drafted a number ofseparate provisions on the subject, one ofwhich provided:
ARTICLE 40 (a)
The fact that the accused acted in obedience to the orders of a superior or in
pursuance of a law or regulation shall not constitute a valid defence, if the
prosecution can show that in view ofthe circumstances the accused had reasonable
grounds to assume that he was committing a breach of this Convention. In such
a case the punishment may nevertheless be mitigated or remitted, if the
circumstances justify.
With respect to this proposed provision the ICRC said: 60
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It establishes, within prescribed limits, the responsibility of offenders; it rejects
the principle, recognized in various military penal codes, that orders received from
a superior exculpate the subordinate who has carried them out.
The text proposed does not, however, go as far as the Declaration of London
of August 8, 1945, which, in the case of ' war crimes', only admitted the plea of
superior orders as a possible extenuating circumstance, the executor of the order
bearing full responsibility.
The suggested text appears to the ICRC to be an acceptable compromise
between obedience to orders,-an essential prerequisite of military
discipline,-and the moral duty to oppose any patent atrocity, such as the massacre
of defenceless women and children.
It should be noted that the onus of proof lies on the prosecution. This is
important in view of the £lct that certain legislations called upon the accused to
prove that he was not guilty.
The experts debated whether, even in the case of flagrant participation in such
violations, the threat of death were not sufficient to constitute a legal excuse for
obeying superior orders. No concession of this kind was however made, as every
latitude is left to the judge to mitigate or remit punishment. This power of
discretion seems the best practical solution to the conflict on this point between
English and Continental conceptions oflaw.
The few bits of legislative history which are available on this subject,
particularly the report of its Special Committee, indicate that the 1949
Diplomatic Conference discarded the forgoing provision on the following
. 61
baslS:
[N]or could general agreement be reached at this stage regarding the notions
of complicity, attempted violation, duress or legitimate defense or the plea 'by
orders of a superior'. These should be left to the judges who would apply the
national laws.
The Diplomatic Conference is not here to work out international penal law.
Bodies fur more competent than we are have tried to do it for years.

As a result, no provision with respect to superior orders appears in the 1949
Geneva Conventions.
In 1971 the ICRe convened a Conference of Government Experts to
consider the drafting of a protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions which,
among other things, would remedy some of the defects in those Conventions
which had surfaced over the years. One of the conclusions reached by
62
Commission IV of that first conference was to the effect that:
556. A number ofshortcomings in the Conventions should be remedied. They
concerned, in particular, the question of superior orders. That problem had not
been provided for in the Conventions, and it was necessary to specify precisely
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under what conditions an accused person could plead that he had received orders
from a superior, as a justification for his commission of an act forbidden by the
Conventions. In order to remedy that deficiency it would be necessary to be
guided by the work of the United Nations which itself took as a basis the principles
laid down by the Nuremberg tribunal.

Apparently the ICRC felt that there was more justification in the decision of
the 1949 Diplomatic Conference than in the recommendation of the 1971
Conference of Government Experts and when it prepared a draft Protocol to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions for consideration by various other preliminary
conferences which it was about to convene, that draft included the following
63
rather innocuous paragraph in its Article 75:
2. The High Contracting Parties shall determine the procedure to be followed
for all application of the principle under which a subordinate is exempted from
any duty to obey an order which would lead him to commit a grave breach of
the provisions of the Conventions and of the present Protocol.

In its Commentary on that provision the ICRC said: 64
In particular, it [the ICRe] considered that the basic question ofsuperior orders
should be settled at the national level, in a manner consistent with the guidelines
laid down in the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, namely, that it should be
possible for soldiers to refuse to obey an order which, if carried out, would
constitute a serious infraction of humanitarian rules. The military regulations of
some countries already contain a provision regarding superior orders and
submission to rank, whereby superiors must only issue orders which conform to
intemationallaw and subordinates are relieved from the obligation to obey an
order which would be contrary thereto and which would cause them to commit
a crime or an offence.

The summary of the discussions of this article that took place at the 1972
(Second) Conference ofGovernment Experts, convened by the ICRC to review
and propose changes in the draft Protocol which the ICRC had prepared,
indicates some of the problems that have been encountered in the efforts to
. ally m
. this area. I t states: 65
ate·mternatIon
Iegts. 1
4.123. A number of experts approved the introduction of a provision on
superior orders, such as proposed in draft Article 75, § 2 of the ICRC text....
The language of that paragraph did not, however, seem sufficiendy clear and a
number ofamendments were proposed. It was pointed out that attempts had been
made in several national legislations to give a satisfactory formulation ofthe defence
of superior orders, a concept recognized by the Charter and the Judgment of the
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International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg; but so fur it had appeared
impossible to find a formula that would really cover all situations and on which
agreement would be general. It would not be right to limit the scope ofthe defence
to grave breaches only (as the ICRC draft did). According to one expert, it should
be stipulated that the subordinate not merely had the right, but was obliged, to
disobey the unlawful order. Some experts, however, were ofa completely opposite
view and demanded the deletion of the proposed paragraph. They laid emphasis
on the necessity to respect the exigencies of military discipline, and they pointed
out that it would be difficult in time ofarmed conflict to permit soldiers to decide
whether to obey or not. It was equally considered that the approach to this question
should be far more general and that the principles recognized by the Nuremberg
Tribunal, the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security ofMankind
should be taken into account.
Actually, there were five separate proposals on the subject of superior orders,
66
none of which was adopted by the Conference. The 1CRC thereupon took
it upon itself to include the following provisions in the Draft Additional Protocol
I prepared by it for use as the Working Document ofthe Diplomatic Conference
which the Swiss Government had already agreed to host beginning in April
67

1974:

ARTICLE 77. -

Superior orders

1. No person shall be punished for refusing to obey an order, of his government
or of a superior which, if carried out, would constitute a grave breach of the
provisions of the Conventions or of the present Protocol.
2. The fact of having acted pursuant to an order of his government or of a
superior does not absolve an accused person from penal responsibility if it be
established that, in the circumstances at the time, he should have reasonably known
that he was committing a grave breach of the Conventions or of the present
Protocol and that he had the possibility of refusing to obey the order.

The 1CRC's Commentary on that provision stated:

68

It was pointed out that this provision might put soldiers in an extremely difficult
position, as they were compelled by military laws and regulations to obey orders
issued to them. That is the reason why it was thought necessary to add to the
sentence "he should have reasonably known that he was committing a grave
breach" the words "and that he had the possibility of refusing to obey the order."
These provisions fared no better in the Diplomatic Conference which drafted
69
the 1977 Protocol 1 than had the comparable provision proposed by the 1CRC
in 1949 fared in the earlier Diplomatic Conference. Fortunately for the
researcher, the action on these provisions is better documented than was that of
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its 1949 predecessor. After considerable debate in Committee I during the 1976
and 1977 sessions of the Diplomatic Conference, a roll call vote was taken in
that Committee to make the basic determination as to whether an article on
superior orders should be included in the Protocol which was being drafted.
That roll call resulted in a favorable vote of 34/9/35.1° To implement that
decision the followi~f article was subsequendy approved by the Committee by
a vote of38/22/15:
Article 77. - Superior orders
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to ensure that their intemallaw
penalizing disobedience to orders shall not apply to orders that would constitute
grave breaches of the Conventions and this Protocol.
2. The mere fact of having acted pursuant to an order of an authority or a
superior does not absolve an accused person from penal responsibility, if it be
established that in the circumstances at the time he knew or should have known
that he was committing a grave breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol. It
may, however, be taken into account in mitigation of punishment.

'

The breadth of the differing views of the various delegations was indicated
by the fact some twenty-five of them found it necessary to explain their votes. 72
Those explanations fell into three general categories: the proposed article either
did, or did not, draw the necessary balance between compliance with
humanitarian law and military discipline; the proposed article either did, or did
not, draw an adequate distinction between national and international law; and
the proposed article properly, or improperly, limited its coverage to "grave
breaches" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the Protocol. Thereafter,
with a minimum of discussion, the article was taken up by the Plenary Meeting
on 30 May 1977 and resulted in a vote 36/25/25.13 As the Conference rules
required a two-thirds majority for the inclusion in the 1977 Protocol I, the vote
constituted a rejection of the article on superior orders. (Although abstainers
were not considered as voting, the 36 affirmative votes out of 61 votes cast
amounted to only 59% of the total. To have been included in the 1977 Protocol
I, 41 of the 61 votes cast were required.)
Conclusion

There has been no international activity in this area since the rejection by the
Diplomatic Conference in 1977 of the provision adopted by the Committee of
that Conference. The current discussions in the International Law Commission
appear to have completely eliminated any reference to the subject; and the
present author is inclined to believe that even if the Commission were to adopt
a provision, perhaps similar to that contained in its 1954 draft of Code of Offences
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Against the Peace and Security ofMankind, it is doubtful that such a provision would
receive the approval of the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly
or that it would be included in any convention submitted to the nations for
adoption. In other words, it appears unlikely that there will be any internationally
approved provision on the subject of superior orders in the foreseeable future?~
Where does that leave the matter? On two occasions specific proposals for
provisions of major humanitarian conventions on the law of war which would
have placed limitations on the availability of superior orders as a defense have
been rejected by large, representative, Diplomatic Conferences. An organ of the
United Nations eliminated such a proposal from the draft of the Genocide
Convention prepared by its Secretary-General. Two specific proposals drafted
by the International Law Commission which included provisions on the subject
ofsuperior orders have met with less than enthusiasm from the General Assembly
of the United Nations. Although this latter was not necessarily directed against
the proposed provisions with respect to superior orders, but might have been
directed against other parts of the documents submitted by the Commission, the
fact remains that in the more than forty years which have elapsed since the
completion of the war crimes trials after World War II, there has been no
successful drafting of such a provision by any international body-and there is
none in ~ight. Unless applicable national law provides otherwise, any defense
counsel in a future war crimes trial would be professionally derelict ifhe failed
to assert to the trial court that the rule denying the availability of the defense of
superior orders has been rejected as a rule of international law and that such a
defense is available to an individual charged with the commission of a violation
of the law of war.
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